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Orellana: Due Process

DUE PROCESS
United States Constitution Amendment MV:
[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty
orproperty, without due process of law ....
New York ConstitutionArticle I, Section 6:
No person shall be derived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Allen'
(decided November 15, 2002)
William Allen was convicted by a jury of two counts of
murder in the second degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first
degree, robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a
weapon in the second degree. 2 In its jury instruction, the court
advised the jurors that the prosecution had the burden of proving
each element of the crime charged beyond a "reasonable doubt"
and proceeded to distinguish "reasonable doubt" from doubt
"affected by sympathy, bias, prejudice, fear, the effects or rewards
or the hope thereof....
The defendant's initial appeal was
4
denied. However, while acting pro se, he again appealed his
conviction on the ground that he was denied assistance of counsel
because his attorney did not challenge the court's "reasonable
doubt" instruction, which defendant claimed was improper.' The
appellate division granted the defendant's appeal on the issue of
'301 A.D.2d 57, 50 N.Y.S.2d 700 (4th Dep't 2002).
2id.

3Id. at 58, 50 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
4 People v. Allen, 178 A.D.2d 994, 995, 579 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (4th Dep't
1991).
5 People v. Allen, 273 A.D.2d 945, 945, 711 N.Y.S.2d 805, 805 (4th Dep't

2000).
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7
whether the United States 6 or New York State Constitution
"requires a jury instruction that specifically defines the 'reasonable
doubt' standard."' 8 Accordingly, the appellate division granted
9
defendant's motion de novo and vacated its previous decision.
The court in Allen looked to the United States Supreme
Court decision of Victor v. Nebraska ° for guidance, noting that
due process afforded by the Federal Constitution did not require or
11
prohibit the trial court "from defining reasonable doubt."
Furthermore, the court noted that New York courts have not
decided "whether a trial court must define 'reasonable doubt,' in
its jury charge."' 2 After analyzing this issue, the appellate court
6

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state

deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. ..."
7
N.Y. CONST. art. I § 6, states in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
8 Allen, 301 A.D.2d at 58, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 701. The defendant had previously
and unsuccessfully appealed, and now moved on a writ of error coram nobis,
advising the court he was denied effective appellate counsel. Id.
9 Id. at 58, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
l0511 U.S. 1 (1994) ("The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement
of due process, but the [U.S.] Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from
defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.").
'" Allen, 301 A.D.2d at 59, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
12 Id. Although there are no New York cases that address the specific
issue,
there are cases that deal with adequate reasonable doubt definitions. See People
v Cubino, 88 N.Y.2d 998, 1000, 671 N.E.2d 1265, 1266, 648 N.Y.S.2d 868,
869, (1996) ("The preferred phrasing to convey the concept and degree of
reasonable doubt is illustrated in the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions: 'The
doubt, to be a reasonable doubt, should be one which a reasonable person acting
in a matter of this importance would be likely to entertain because of the
evidence or because of the lack or insufficiency of the evidence in the case'
(citing Criminal Jury Instructions 6:20, at 249)."); People v Mosley, 67 N.Y.2d
985, 987, 494 N.E.2d 98, 99, 502 N.Y.S.2d 993, 994 (1986) (finding jury
instructions sufficient); People v Berger, 234 A.D.2d 980, 980, 653 N.Y.S.2d
461, 463 (4th Dep't 1996) (finding charge to the jury did not violate defendant's
rights); People v Towndrow, 187 A.D.2d 194, 197, 594 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (4th
Dep't 1993) (reversing defendant's convictions because of improper jury
instructions); People v Garcia, 179 A.D.2d 1047, 1048, 579 N.Y.S.2d 518, 519
(4th Dep't 1992) ("[T]he additional gratuitous comments by the trial court in its
charge were patently improper and were properly objected to by defense
counsel. In our view, those improper comments, when coupled with the trial
court's earlier improper use of the phrase 'good, sound substantial reasons',
failed to convey the proper standard to the jury and require us to reverse
defendant's conviction").
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unanimously upheld Allen's conviction, holding that "the trial
court was only required to advise the jury of the prosecution's
burden of proof beyond a 'reasonable doubt' but was not required
to give a specific definition."' 3 Furthermore, the appellate court
concluded the defendant's due process rights were not violated
when the trial court distinguished beyond a "reasonable doubt"
from doubt "affected by sympathy, bias, prejudice, fear, the effects
or rewards or the hope thereof....
The Allen Court noted that the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth,
Tenth, and D.C. Circuit Courts hold that there is no requirement
that a "reasonable doubt" definition must be given.1 5 The Second
Circuit held, in Gaines v. Kelly, 16 that a trial court is not required to
define reasonable doubt.' 7 During its charge to the jury, the Gaines
trial court provided seven different definitions of reasonable
doubt.' 8 The appellate court in Gaines reasoned that the cumulative
effect of the "definitions, caused the jury to apply the 'reasonable
doubt' standard in an unconstitutional manner" and, thereby,
"impaired the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding that
led to Gaines' conviction." 1 9 The court further reasoned that the
seven "reasonable doubt" definitions may have confused the jurors
which would "undermine the strictness of the standard., 20 The
3

Allen, 301 A.D.2d at 58, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
Id. at 59, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
15 Id. (citing Gaines v. Kelly, 202 F.3d 598, 605 (2d Cir. 2000) (["A] trial court
may choose freely either to define reasonable doubt or to refrain from defining it
[,] but if the trial court chooses to define it, then the instructions, 'taken as a
whole ... [must] correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the
jury'); LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705, 716 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that
defendant's rights were not violated when the trial court did not provide the jury
with an instruction defining reasonable doubt); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d
1551, 1557-58, (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding a trial court is not required to give
specific jury instructions defining reasonable doubt); United States v. Adkins,
937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding a definition of reasonable doubt not
required in jury instructions); United States v. Nolasco, 926 F.2d 869, 872 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding a trial court may refuse to define reasonable doubt); United
States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 146-47 (Ist Cir. 1988) (holding a trial court's
refusal not to define reasonable doubt is not a constitutional violation )).
16 202 F.3d at 598.
1d. at 605.
1d. at 600.
14

19 Id.
20
Id. at 609.
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court concluded that a trial court needs only to instruct the jury of
proof beyond a "reasonable doubt" and "must correctly convey the
concept of 'reasonable doubt"' if the court chooses to define
reasonable doubt. 2 1 The court reversed the judgment of the
district
22
release.
defendant's
or
trial
new
a
either
court and ordered
The Allen Court also relied on LaFevers v. Gibson,23 where
the Tenth Circuit found no constitutional violations with the jury
instructions, which did not define reasonable doubt.24 The
defendant, Loyd LaFevers, appealed his convictions and death
sentence on various grounds. LaFevers argued the trial court
violated his constitutional rights when it failed to provide the jury
with an instruction defining the term reasonable doubt. 26 The Tenth
Circuit rejected this argument and held that the trial court is not
required to define reasonable doubt, rather, it is only required to
instruct the jury "that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." 27 The court reasoned that the constitution does
not require a trial court to define reasonable doubt.28
Furthermore, the Allen Court looked to United States v.
29
Taylor,
which also found no violation of defendants'30
constitutional due process rights when the judge charged the jury.
The defendants in Taylor requested that the trial court use the
"Redbook" definition of "reasonable doubt," however, the court
denied this request. 31 The trial court's charge to the jury was
"drawn from the Federal Judicial Center's Pattern Criminal Jury
Instructions."32 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held the trial court was not required, pursuant to the United States
21 Gaines, 202 F.3d at 605.
22

id. at 610.

23 182 F.3d at 705.
24 Allen, 301 A.D.2d

at 58, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 700.

LaFevers, 182 F.3d at 709. Defendant was convicted of kidnapping and
murder.
26 Id. at Id.
716.
25

27

id.

28 id.
29

997 F.2d at 1551.

Id. at 1560; Allen, 301 A.D.2d at 58, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
Taylor, 997 F.2d at 1555. The "Redbook" is a book containing jury
instructions published by the Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of
the
District of Columbia. Id.
32
30

31

Id. at 1555.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss2/7

4

Orellana: Due Process

2003

DUE PROCESS

Constitution, to give specific jury instructions on the burden of
3 Therefore, the court affirmed
proof or define reasonable doubt.
34
the defendants' convictions.
Similarly, in United States v. Adkins, 35 the Fourth Circuit
held the trial court was not required to define the term reasonable
doubt.36 The defendant appealed his conviction on several grounds,
including an incomplete jury instruction. 37 However, the Fourth
Circuit rejected defendant's argument and found there was no
attempt to define reasonable doubt. 38 The court further stated that
the Fourth Circuit has "warned against giving the jury definitions
of reasonable doubt," except where a jury requests a definition.39
Accordingly, Adkins' conviction was affirmed.4 °
Likewise, in United States v. Nolasco,4 1 the court held 42a
trial court's refusal to define reasonable doubt was' constitutional.
In Nolasco, the defendant appealed his conviction arguing that the
trial court violated his constitutional rights because his request to
define reasonable doubt was denied.43 The Ninth Circuit found no
constitutional violations and held that it is within the trial court's
discretion whether to define reasonable doubt.4 4 In holding that an
"appropriate instruction defining 'reasonable doubt' is permissible
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
but not necessarily required,"
4
defendant's conviction.
46
The Allen Court also noted that United States v. Littlefield
held the trial court's refusal to explain "reasonable doubt" to the
jurors was not a violation of defendant's due process rights.47
During the jury instruction, the Littlefield court refused to explain
31 Id. at 1557.
34 id. at 1560.

" 937 F.2d at 947.
36

Id. at 950.

37

id.

38

Id.

39 Id.

40 Adkins,

937 F.2d at 953.
869.

41 926 F.2d at
42 Id. at 870.
43 Id.

44Id.
41

Id. at 872-73.
F.2d at 143.

46
47 840

Id. at 146; Allen, 301 A.D.2d at 60, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
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the concept of "reasonable doubt" to the jurors. 48 The First Circuit
reasoned that the trial court's emphasis on the government's
burden of proof for all crimes charged was enough to satisfy
procedural due process requirements, and no explanation of
"reasonable doubt" was required. 49 Therefore, the First Circuit
found no violation of defendant's constitutional due process
rights.5 °
Because there is no New York precedent that deals with
this specific issue, the Allen court also looked to other state court
decisions, such as Chase v. State,5' for guidance. In Chase, the
Mississippi court refused the defendant's request to read to the jury
"D-2" instructions, which is a circumstantial evidence instruction
that explains reasonable doubt. 52 Instead, the court charged the jury
with a "D-7" instruction, which states that in order for the jury to
find the defendant guilty, the state must meet its burden of
"proving the defendant guilty beyond any reasonable doubt, the
State must prove each and every essential element of the offense
charged; and that before the Jury may convict, they must be
convinced of each and every essential element beyond a reasonable
doubt." 53 The court reasoned that a circumstantial evidence
instruction was unnecessary, because Chase and his accomplice54
both testified at trial, and their testimony was direct evidence.
Furthermore, the court added that reasonable doubt is selfexplanatory and needs no definition. 55 The Court found that the
"D-7" instruction adequately satisfied the trial court's procedural
due process requirements and held there was no violation of
defendant's due process rights.56
Similarly, in State v. Johnson,57 the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that the trial court's refusal to explain
48 Littlefield, 840
49 Id.
50 Id.

F.2d at 146.

"'
52 645 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1994).
Id.at 850.
53Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.

So.2d. at 851.
445 S.E.2d 637 (S.C. 1994).

56 645
17
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"reasonable doubt" was constitutionally permissible. 58 Johnson
asserted that his due process rights were violated when the judge
59
refused his request to explain the concept of reasonable doubt.
However, the court reasoned that "the phrase 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' without an explanation of its legal significance is much
more favorable to a defendant than when amplified by an
explanation." 60 Thus, the court found there was no error.6'
Moreover, in State v. McMahon,62 the Supreme Court of
Vermont held a trial court is not required to define "reasonable
doubt., 63 In McMahon, the trial judge advised the jury numerous
times of the "reasonable doubt" standard during jury instruction
but never defined the concept, nor did defendant request it. 64 The
appeals court reasoned that any attempt to explain reasonable
doubt would only lead to confusion of the jurors. 65 Thus, the court
affirmed defendant's conviction, concluding that such a concept is
better left unexplained.66
Furthermore, the Allen court relied on People v. Tokich,67
in concluding its analysis of this issue.68 In Tokich, the trial court
refused the jury's request to define reasonable doubt. 6 9 The court
reasoned that because defendant failed to object when the judge
denied the jury's request for a reasonable doubt definition, and did
not submit specific instructions on how to explain reasonable
doubt to the jury, the defendant waived the issue. 70 Additionally,
the court added that the law in Illinois is clear on this issue:
58 Id. at 638.
59 ld. at
60
6!

id.

637.

Id. at 638.

62 603 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1992).
63
1 d. at 1128.

64 Id.
65 Id. The court cited to State v. Blay, 58 A. 794, 795 (Vt.
1904), which stated

"attempts to define the term are futile; 'that the words are of plain and
unmistakable meaning, and that any definition on the part of the court tends only
to confuse the jury and to render uncertain an expression which, standing alone,
is certain and intelligible."' Id.
6

id.

734 N.E.2d 117 (Ill. App. 2000).
Allen, 301 A.D.2d at 60, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
69 Tokich, 734 N.E.2d at 121.
70 id.
67

68
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"Neither the trial court nor counsel should define 'reasonable
doubt' for the jury.",7 1 Thus, the court held that even if a jury
requests that reasonable doubt be defined, it is not to be defined.72
In conclusion, federal courts have given trial judges
discretion in deciding whether to define, specifically or otherwise,
the concept of reasonable doubt. 73 Alternatively, state courts have
either refused to allow a trial court to explain reasonable doubt or
have disfavored any attempt to explain the concept.74 Thus, the
Appellate Division, Fourth Department held that no specific
definition of "reasonable doubt" was required from the trial court
in its jury instructions.75 Thus, the Fourth Department found that
Allen's constitutional due process rights
were not violated and
6
convictions.
his
affirmed
unanimously

Joaquin Orellana

71Id. (citing People v. Speight, 606 N.E.2d 1174, 1177, (Ill. 1992);
People v.
Malmenato, 150 N.E.2d 806, 811 (Ill. 1958)).
72 Id.

" Allen, 301 A.D.2d at 58, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 700 (citing Gaines, 202 F.3d at

605).

74 Id.

(citing Chase, 645 So. 2d at 850 (["R]easonable doubt defines itself and
needs no further definition by the court"); Johnson, 445 S.E.2d at 637 ("[T]he
phrase 'beyond a reasonable doubt' without an explanation of its legal
significance is much more favorable to a defendant than when amplified by an
explanation"); McMahon, 603 A.2d at 1128 ("'[D]efining' "reasonable doubt" is
a hazardous undertaking because it seems the more said about it to the jury, the
less protection that concept provides the accused"'); Tokich, 34 N.E.2d at 122,
("[T]he law in Illinois on this subject is clear. Neither the trial court nor counsel
should define reasonable doubt for the jury").
" Allen, 301 A.D.2d at 58, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
76 id.
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